By: Rafaela Dancygier, Princeton University; Sirus H. Dehdari, Stockholm University; David D. Laitin, Stanford University; Moritz Marbach, University College London; Kåre Vernby, Stockholm University
The following blog post summarizes the research that was the winner of the 2026 Midwest Political Science Association’s American Journal of Political Science Award for the best article appearing in the volume of the American Journal of Political Science published in the year preceding the conference.
The rise of populist radical right (PRR) parties is widely recognized as a threat to liberal democracy and has received extensive attention as a result. Popular opinion, the scholarly literature, and the rhetoric of these parties link their ascent to immigration. This view is challenged by electoral realities where large urban centers—the home of many immigrants—are rarely bastions of PRR support. We argue that the emphasis on immigration has obscured another demographic trend that can fuel PRR success: emigration.
We theorize that the departure of citizens due to internal and international emigration may affect elections via two complementary mechanisms: changing composition and changing preferences. Emigration alters the composition of electorates. Emigrants are disproportionately young and motivated adults who seek educational and economic opportunities in cosmopolitan surroundings. The population that remains is less educated and more rooted in place, attributes linked to PRR voting. As a result, when regions experience substantial out-migration, this compositional change can promote PRR success without affecting voting behavior.
Emigration can also alter voter preferences and thereby influence voting behavior. The departure of individuals of prime working age who would have supported the local economy, formed families, and contributed to a communal life makes emigration locales less livable. Emigration can thus adversely affect public and private services, leading to school and business closures and straining the viability of public transport and healthcare systems. Those who remain may therefore suffer materially and psychologically, feeling that emigration devalues the status of their hometowns and communities. This decrease in quality of life gives rise to grievances on which populist parties capitalize, especially if they can convince voters that they have been deserted by established parties.
Turning to empirical tests, we first chart broad outlines and present correlations between population loss and populist radical right party vote shares at the sub-national level across Europe. We show that municipalities that have lost population show stronger support for PRR parties.
To evaluate more precisely the effect of emigration on the electoral fortunes of the radical right and to evaluate the compositional and preference-based mechanisms, we turn to Sweden, where a PRR party – the Sweden Democrats (SD) – has made significant electoral gains in recent years, currently holding 21% of the seats in the national parliament (Riksdag). Our empirical analysis takes advantage of fine-grained panel data covering elections at the precinct-level provided by Statistics Sweden. This allows us to track individuals’ place of residence across general elections, and to combine these data with general election outcomes across Swedish precincts.
The core result is straightforward: when more people leave, the Sweden Democrats gain. When measuring the number of departures relative to the total population at baseline, our estimates from a panel regression with two-way fixed effects suggest that the departure of 100 people from a municipality increases SD vote shares by about half a percentage point. This effect is substantively large, considering that the Sweden Democrats receive on average 8.3% in a precinct during the covered time period. Importantly, we conduct further analyses to show that the emigration effect is not merely a proxy for local economic decline.
Turning to mechanisms, we find that supporters of the Sweden Democrats are less likely to be movers—compared to many other parties, they are more likely to stay in their municipality. As a result, out-migration can mechanically raise the relative weight of voters more inclined toward the radical right, providing evidence for the compositional mechanism.
But the preference-based mechanism is also at play. For example, precincts whose populations hold steady but that are located within municipalities that experience emigration—and therefore associated quality-of-life declines—also see a rise in SD vote shares.
Voter surveys, elite interviews and newspaper analyses complement our electoral data.
We find that greater out‑migration corresponds with lower satisfaction with public goods and services, a decline residents often attribute to Social Democratic neglect of their historically loyal communities, thereby fueling votes in support for the Sweden Democrats. Interviews with party officials add further insight. Social Democratic officials face the opprobrium of these constituents, with one ruing that “Every time someone hits a pothole, the Sweden Democrats gain five votes.” Finally, a content analysis of a random sample of 4,970 newspaper articles focusing on local out-migration revealed concern about loss of public services but almost no mention of immigration.
One implication of our account is that the local protest route for PRR success suggests an uncertain future for these parties. The forces driving out-migration are not easily reversed. As SD politicians move into ruling coalitions in municipalities facing further decline, their appeal may well weaken if they are not able to deliver. These dynamics carry strategic implications for center-left parties: returning to their roots as champions of public goods providers beyond urban centers may yield greater electoral dividends for these parties than a repositioning as anti-immigration hawks.
The views and opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the MPSA (Midwest Political Science Association). Any content provided is for informational purposes only and should not be taken as official statements or endorsements by MPSA.